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NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff appeals from Orders of the Public Service 
Commission of Utah (PSC or Commission) issued in PSCU Case No. 
82-035-14 in which Utah Power & Light Company (Utah Power or 
Company) was granted in effect a one-time increase in rates of 
$6,012,000 to be collected from Utah ratepayers during future 
period to partially make up for revenues received during the test 
year of PSCU Case No. 81-035-13 ending September, 1982 which were 
lower than revenues projected by the Company and included in 
rates. 
DISPOSITION BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 
Upon application by Utah Power, a majority of the 
Public Service Commission, by Order dated December 30, 1982, 
granted the Company's request to remove $6.012,000 from the 
Energy Balancing Account (EBA) of the Company, Account No. 191, 
which absent the Commission's Order, would have been returned to 
ratepayers in the form of an adjustment to the energy component 
of Utah Power's rates. The removal of $6.012,000 from the EBA 
offset Company expenses in 1982 with the result of increasing 
Company earnings for calendar year 1982 and requiring an increase 
in future rates to make up for the adjustment. On July 5, 1983, 
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after rehearing, a majority of the Corrm1ssion affirmed its 
original decision. Pursuant to § 54-6-16. Utah Code Annotated 
1953, plaintiff appeals directly to this Court. 
RELIEF SOUGtiT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks a determination by the Court that the 
Orders of the Public Service Commission issued in Case No. 
82-035-14 are void and unlawful as a matter of law and requests 
the Court to vacate said Orders with directions to the Public 
Service Commission to return to the balance of the EBA the amount 
removed by sa10 Orders in order to allow those funds to be 
returned to ratepayers through the operation of the EBA 
procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On October 8, 1982, Utah Power filed an application 
with the Public Service Commission, Case No. 82-035-14, styled 
"In the Matter of the Application of Utah Power & Light Company 
to Implement the Company's Energy Balancing Account for the 
Period Septerr.ber, 1981, through September, 1982." The applica-
ti on requested the transfer of $6. 012, 000 from the then-existing 
balance in the Company's EBA to the Company. 
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Hearings were held on the application December 2, and 
3, 1982. At the hearing, two witnesses testified on behalf of 
Utah Power. Dean L. Bryner testified as to the Company's view of 
purpose of the EBA pass-through procedure and the circumstances 
relating to the Company's request for a transfer of dollars from 
the EBA to the Company. He testified that during the general 
rate Case No. 81-035-13. which used a test-year period of 12 
months ending Septerr.ber, 1982 for the purposes of projecting Utah 
Jurisdictional revenues, expenses and investment as the basis of 
determining future rates, the Company's actual Utah jurisdiction-
al sales were $40,000,000 less than projected by the Company and 
included by the Commission in the determination of rates. The 
reduction in jurisdictional sales created an unanticipated 
opportunity to make additional shortterm excess energy sales 
(termed by the Company surplus nontariff sales, which means sales 
from assets allocated to serve Utah jurisdictional customers that 
are made to non-jurisdictional customers or unexpected additional 
sales from surplus to jurisdictional customers) of $18,054,000. 
Mr. Bryner argued that the current energy pass-through 
process, which off sets against energy expenses all nontarif f 
sales revenues, created a "substantial windfall" to ratepayers at 
the expense of the Company. He argued that one-third of the 
cidd1tiona1 revenue created by the loss of jurisdictional sales 
should not be credited against energy costs but should be used to 
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increase Company earnings. Mr. Bryner testified that this 
$6,012,000 adjustment should not affect Case No. 82-035-13, an 
application by the Company for a general increase in rates to 
customers using a test-year period of September, 1982 through 
September, 1983 (and being considered by the Public Service 
Commission concurrently with the request in this proceedins) 
since the revenue shortfall was experienced only in the test year 
related to Case No. 81-035-13 (Record 5-10). Orrin T. Colby, Jr. 
reiterated Mr. Bryner's testimony and verified his calculations. 
In addition, he testified with regard to the Company's financial 
condition for the 12 months ended August, 1982. He presented 
figures for earnings per share, dividend payout ratio and return 
on common equity for those periods on a total Company basis 
(including business operations in Wyoming, Idaho and wholesale 
operations regulated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion). Mr. Colby estimated Utah jurisdictional return on equity 
to be about 13.25% stating that it was below the return on equity 
authorized in Case No. 81-035-13 of 16.3%. He testified that ~e 
Company proposal would improve earnings per share and return on 
common equity for the calendar year 1982. (Record 47-57). 
The Division of Public Utilities (Division or 
Plaintiff) presented testimony through Dr. George Compton, that 
based on current financial conditions and investors' expecta-
tions, the requested infusion of dollars with the result of 
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improving the Company's financial condition was not necessary. 
In addition, Dr. Compton objected to the proposal of the Company 
because 1) it was retroactive in nature and 2) if the Commission 
wished to reduce risk, borne by shareholders of the Company, that 
jurisdictional revenues received will be less than and approved 
by the Commission that the Commission must also look at the other 
side of the coin; that is, reduce the risk borne by ratepayers 
that jurisdictional revenues received by the Company will be 
higher than those approved by the Commission. Dr. Compton 
suggested the consideration by the Commission of prospective 
modification of the energy pass-through procedure to consider 
both issues. (Record 101-126). 
At the conclusion of the presentation of evidence, the 
Division of Public Utilities verbally moved the Commission to 
dismiss the application. The Division argued that 1) the 
Company's request was being improperly considered as an energy 
cost pass-through pursuant to§ 54-7-12(3) (d), Utah Code Ann. 
1981 Amend.); 2) the request was in contravention of the rule 
prohibiting retroactive ratemaking; and, 3) because the request 
was not an energy cost pass-through such a rate increase could 
not be granted without a determination that rates were just and 
reasonable based on evidence with regard to basic ratemaking 
components and that such evidence was not presented. The Com-
mission failed to rule on the Division's Motion. 
CASE NOS . 19 3 61, 19 3 6 2 
Page 6 
On December 30, 1982, the Com~ission issued its Order 
granting the application of Utah Power. The Commission, in its 
findings, recited the evidence presented by Utah Power including 
earnings per share, dividend payout ratio, and return on equity 
for the 12 months ended August, 1982, found that the Company harl 
been authorized a return in equity by the Public Service Comm1s-
sion in Case No. 81-035-13 of 16.3% and concluded that "the 
adjustment proposed by the Company was just and reasonable and 
should be allowed". However, the Commission also concluded that 
any future adjustments of this kind must be Frospective in 
nature. 
The Order was silent as to the evidence presented by 
the plaintiff that current financial conditions and market 
expectations did not require the infusion of earnings requested 
by the Company. The Order was also silent as to the legal 
arguments raised in the plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss. Commis-
sioner Bryne dissented, objectins to the retroactive nature of 
the Company's request stating "this Commission shoul6 not engage 
in retroactively assisting the Company when earnings are low or 
in retroactively punishing the Company when earnings are high". 
The Order of the Public Service Commission is attached hereto as 
Appendix 1. 
Because the Order was issued in the closing days of 
1982, the transfer of dollars was made by Utah Power with the 
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effect that the Company's financial condition was improved for 
calendar year 1982. 
On January 19, 1983, within the time provided by law, 
plaintiff filed with the Commission its Petition for a Rehearing 
and Reconsideration pursuant to the requirements of § 54-7-15, 
f,tah Code Annotated (1981 amendment). The Committee of Consumer 
Services also filed with the Commission a Motion for Rehearing 
and Reconsideration. By Order dated April 20, 1983, the 
Commission granted the Motion for Rehearing of the Division and 
the Committee. Hearing was held the 24th and 25th days of May, 
1983. At the hearing, further testimony as presented by Mr. 
Bryner, which further explained the Company's views as to the 
purpcse and function of the EBA. Hr. Colby also testified as to 
the financial effect on the Company should the Commission's Order 
be reversed on rehearing. 
By Order dated July 5, 1983, the Commission reaffirmed 
its original decision in the proceeding. The majority of the 
Commission concluded that 1) the adjustment to the EBA approved 
by the Commission in this proceeding was "consistent" with other 
adJustments previously and currently made and did not alter the 
Commission-approved rate. 2) the "adjustment" was within the 
01 ·tl1ority of the Commission, 3) it was consistent with the 
Commission's intent that the EBA "eliminate ineq~itable results 
or windfall benefits to either the Company or its ratepayers" 
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and, 4) the "adjustment" was not retroactive ratemaking. 
Commissioner Byrne again dissented. The Order on Rehearing is 
attached hereto as Appendix 2. Thereafter, on August 3, 1983, 
plaintiff petitioned this Court for Writ of Certiorari pursuant 
to the requirements of § 54-7-16. Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
Concurrent with the filing of the Petition for Certiorari, 
plaintiff requested of this Court a stay or suspension of the 
Public Service Commission's decision pending the outcome of this 
appeal. After oral argument by Plaintiff and intervenor Utah 
Power, the plaintiff's Motion was denied, by a Minute Entry oatec 
August 15, 1983. 
ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCT 101' 
In order to understand the nature of this appeal end 
the effect of the Public Service Commission decision in the 
proceeding before the Court, an understanding of the Public 
Utility regulatory process in the state of Utah is essential. 
Plaintiff intends, therefore, to as simply and briefly as 
possible describe the means available to the Public Service 
Commission to adjust utility rates within the authority delegatec 
to the Public Service Commission by the Legislature as set forth 
in Title 54 Utah Code Ann. 
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After .Ml.inn v. Illinois , 94 u.s. 113, 24 L.Ed. 77 
(1877), where the United States Supreme Court upheld an Illinois 
statute fixing maximum rates for the storage of grain by public 
warehousemen saying that such regulation was "for the public 
good", there had been a search for general standards in setting 
of fair rates for regulated industries. ~ v. ~ , 169 
ll.S. 466 18 s.ct. 418, 42 L.Ed. 819 (1898), was an early attempt 
lo develop such standards. There, the Court held that the basis 
for all calculations as to reasonableness of rates must be the 
"fair value" of the property used in serving the public. This 
was later called the "rate base". 
Building on ~ , Justice Brandeis in his now 
universally followed concurring opinion in Missouri ex rel 
Southwestern Bell Telephone Company v. ~ , 262 U.S. 276, 
43 s.ct. 544, 67 L.Ed. 981 (1923), articulated the standard for 
"just and reasonable" rates: 
To decide whether a proposed rate 
is confiscatory, the tribunal must determine 
both what sum would be earned under it, and 
whether that sum would be a fair return. The 
decision involves ordinarily the making of 
four subsidiaries one: 
1) What the gross earnings from operating a 
utility under the rate in controversy would 
be (a prediction). 
2) What the operating expenses and charges 
while so operating would be (a prediction). 
3) The rate base, that is what the amount is 
on which a return should be earned. (Under 
iS..my_th v. ~ an opinion, largely.) 
4) What rate of return should be deemed 
fair. (An opinion, largely.) 
262 U.S. at 291. 
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Subsequently, numerous cases have attempted to better 
define the basic requirements mentioned by Brandeis. See, for 
example, ~ v. Hope Natural G,;is ComJ;?any , 320 U.S. 591, 6; 
s.ct. 2Bl, BB L.Ed. 333 (1944), discussing proper rate base 
determination and Bluefield Water Works. and ImJ;?royement 
Company v. ~ , 262 U.S. 679, 43 s.ct. 675 and 67 L.Ed. 476 
(1923) discussing "fair rate of return". 
Over the years. a well-defined standard for the 
determination of "just and reasonable" rates has solidified. 
This standard is applicable in the state of Utah (§ 54-3-1 Utah 
Code Ann. 1977 Amend.), and the procedure developed to assist in 
the determination of "just and reasonable" rates is also used in 
the State of Utah. This procedure was described by this Court ir 
Utah Department of Business Regulation Division of Public 
Utilities v. Public Service Comroissi.Qn , 614 P.2d 1242 (19BO), 
citing City of Los Angeles v. Public Utilities Commission , 
497 P.2d 7B5, 797 (1972): 
In City of Los Anaeles v. ~ 
Utilities Commission , the Court pointed out 
that the basic approach in ratemaking is to 
take a test year and determine the revenues. 
expenses. in investment for the test year 
period. Test year results are adjusted to 
allow for reasonably-anticipated changes in 
revenues. expenses. or other conditions in 
order that the test period results of oper-
ations will be as nearly representative of 
future conditions as possible. The Commis-
sion may adjust all figures, revenue, 
expense. and investment for anticipated 
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changes, but it may not adjust one side or 
part of the equation without adjusting the 
other •• 
In determining a just and reason-
able rate, the gross revenue should be of a 
sum to cover two distinct components, the 
operating expense and the return on invested 
capital. The return (the profit) is calcu-
lated solely on the rate base (the capital 
contributed by the investors); a utility is 
not entitled to earn an additional profit on 
its expenses but only to recover those costs 
on a dollar-for-dollar basis. In a general 
rate proceeding, the Commission determines 
for a test period the expenses. the rate 
base, and the rate of return to be allowed. 
Based on those figures, the Commission deter-
mines the revenue requirements, then fixes a 
rate to produce sufficient income to meet the 
revenue requirements. 
This formula is used only to determine rates 
prospectively in effect. Section 54-4-4(1) Utah Code Ann. 
(1953) gives the Public Service Commission authority to 
"determine just, reasonable or sufficient rates, •• 
to be thereafter observed and in force". 
In implementing this prohibition against retroactive 
ratemaking, the Commission looks to the future, using a future 
test year pursuant to§ 54-4-4(3) (Utah Code Ann. 1975 Amend.), 
on the premise that, particularly in inflationary t!.mes. the 
future test period more accurately reflects conditions faced by 
the Company during the time the rates would be in effect. The 
Commission ignores occurrences prior to the test year whatever 
lhey may have been. 
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In order to arrive at rates which are just and 
reasonable using the rate-making procedure described, it is 
essential that all elements of revenue derived from utility 
assets, as well as expenses incurred in providing utility service 
be considered. However, because rates are always set prospect-
ively, there exists the pcssiblity that actual revenues, expenses 
and investment may be different than expected. There exists a 
risk for both ratepayers and the utility. The Company takes the 
risk that earnings will be less than intended by the Public 
Service Commission (until an adjustment can be made) and rate-
payers take the risk that Company earnings may be better than 
authorized (until an adjustment can be made). This risk rela-
tionship helps promote cost effective and productive operations 
of utilties since any productivity gains directly affect earn-
ings, and has been generally accepted in utility regulation. 
(A more complete discussion of this principle follows in Point 
III herein.) 
During the time of the energy crisis of the early '70s, 
it became apparent that existing regulatory practices were not 
adequate to deal with volatile, unpredictable expenses such as 
fuel costs. Because fuel costs are typically a substantial 
pcrtion of a utility's expense, rapid unforseen increases in such 
costs had devastating effects on utility earnings. Legislators 
responded by implementing statutory methods of allowing rapid 
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adjustments in rates to pass these increased costs along to 
customers. These methods. often known generically as "fuel 
adjustment clauses", took many different forms but were typically 
limited to a dollar-to-dollar pass-through of fuel costs incurred 
by the utility. 
In Otah, H.B. 227 was introduced in the Legislature in 
1975, which resulted in an amendment to§ 54-7-12(1) Utah Code 
Ann. (1953). Prior to the amendment. subsection (1) provided: 
No public utility shall raise any 
rate ••• under any circumstances whatever, 
except upon a showing before the commission 
and a finding by the commission that such 
increase is justified. 
After 1975, subsection (1) read: 
No public utility shall raise any 
rate, fare, toll, rental, or charge or so 
alter any classification, contract. practice, 
rule or regulation as to result in an 
increase in any rate, fare, toll, rental or 
charge under any circumstances whatsoever 
except in the case of fuel cost increases to 
the utility by an independent contractor or 
other independent source of supply and then 
only upon a showing before the commission and 
a finding by the commission that such 
increase is justified. 
Prior to 1975, the only procedure set forth in the 
statutes for obtaining a rate increase was that in 54-7-12(2), 
Utah Code Ann. (1953), designed to accommodate a general rate 
case proceeding. After 1975, with the amendment of§ 54-7-12(1), 
the opportunity existed for a more responsive action by the 
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Commission related to utility fuel costs from an independent 
source ot supply. 
The exception to general rate case treatment was 
narrowly defined by the Legislature. While the Legislature 
wished the regulatory process to be flexible enough to be 
responsive to volatile and unpredictable costs. there was the 
expression of concern about the misuse of the amendment by 
utilities attempting to raise company profits and concern that 
the amendment would result in the reduction of incentives to be 
efficient and cost-effective in operations. Therefore. the 
Legislature limited the so-called "pass-through statute" to a 
pass-through of fuel cost increases from independent sources of 
supply with a finding by the Commission that the increase is 
"Justified". Tapes of House of Representatives Floor Debate, 
H.B. 227, Feb. 12, 14, 1975. 
The pass-through statute was amended in 1976 and again 
in 1981 in order to better define expenses which qualified for 
pass-through treatment and to streamline the pass-through proced-
ure. § 54-7-12(3) (d), Utah Code Ann. (1981 Amend.) now reads: 
If a public utility files a 
proposed rate increase based on an increase 
cost to the utility for fuel or energy pur-
chased or obtained from independent con-
tractors, other independent suppliers. or any 
supplier whose prices are regulated by a 
governmental agency, the commission shall 
issue a tentative order with respect to such 
proposed increase within ten days after the 
proposal is filed unless it issues a final 
order with respect to such rate increases in 
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20 days after the proposal was filed. A pub-
lic hearing shall be held by the commission 
within 30 days after issuance of such 
tentative order to determine if the proposed 
rate increase is just and reasonable. 
In a pass-through proceeding only evidence related to 
energy costs is considered and a Commission finding that a rate 
increase is just and reasonable only relates to the energy cost 
component of the rates collected from customers. since only 
energy costs are considered. 
The vehicle developed for the purpose of i~plementing 
the Legislature's intent with regard to the pass through of 
energy related costs for both gas and electric utilities has been 
the Energy Balancing Account. The Energy Balancing Account (EBA) 
was instituted by the Commission for Utah Power & Light in Case 
Nos. 78-035-21 and 79-035-03 in a general rate Order issued July 
20, 1979, and the pertinent portions of which are attached hereto 
as Appendix 3. 
In the context of Utah Power not only fuel costs. 
(coal) were unpredictable but also the cost of purchased energy 
and non-tariff revenues. It was because these energy related 
costs and revenues could not be adequately projected in general 
rate cases that the EBA was instituted. The Commission found: 
The commission notes that Utah 
Power is in a unique position to acquire and 
use or sell inexpensive hydropower from the 
northwest as well as sell at a profit power 
generated with its own surplus capacity to 
oil-burning electric utilities in the south-
west. Because of fluctuations and the avail-
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bility of hydropower. however, there can be 
wide variations in the revenue available from 
the sales of such power and the amount of 
fuel costs saved when such power is used to 
offset internal generation. 
Because of these wide variations. 
the appropriate treatment of expense and 
revenue attributable to purchase power sales 
for resale and fuel costs is of considerable 
concern to the commission. During the course 
of these proceedings. the division presented 
testimony on appropriate amounts to be allo~­
ed for purchase power and sales for resale 
which differ significantly from figures 
proposed by the company. Given that these 
items have not been susceptible to accurate 
estimation, we conclude that the division's 
figures are as much a guess as Utah Power's. 
Therefore. we have declined to adjust the 
revenue requirement found herein by the 
amounts proposed by the division as well as 
those adjustments proposed by Utah Power as 
they relate to sales for resale and energy 
costs. 
The commission concludes that it 
would be reasonable and in the public inter-
est for Utah Power to establish an energy-
balancing account which is designed to track 
the actual annual costs and revenues attri-
butable to these items making estimates 
thereof unnecessary in future cases. 
Order page 14, paragraphs 31-33. 
The EBA is an account which is intended to keep track 
of over or under collections in net energy costs. If in previous 
periods the energy component of rates to customers has been 
insufficient to cover all net energy costs, there will be a 
balance in the EBA in favor of Utah Power which indicates that 
they have not recovered all of their energy costs. Conversely, 
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if the energy component of the rate actually overcollects net 
energy costs, there will be a balance in favor of ratepayers 
which must be returned to ratepayers in the future in the form 
of a reduced energy cost component of rates. 
Utah Power's rates to customers are made up of a non-
energy component-items considered in a general rate case, and an 
energy component-items related to net energy costs. The energy 
component is adjusted in energy balancing account pass-through 
proceedings. 
In determining the appropriate energy component, the 
Commission will approve projections as to energy expenses for a 
future period, which costs include projections as to the cost and 
amount of coal to be used in Utah Power generating facilities and 
the cost of purchased power projected to be used by the Company. 
Offset against these costs are projections of non-tariff 
revenues. The third element is the current balance in the EBA, 
whether in favor of ratepayers or in favor of the Company. 
An energy component of the rate is calculated which 
will, during the future period measured, recover for the Company 
actual net energy-related costs and also bring the EBA balance 
to zero. For example, if in past periods the Company has over 
r_·ollected in rates for its net energy expenses, there would be a 
balance in favor of ratepayers in the EBA. For a future period, 
the Company would calculate the amount necessary to be collected 
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in rates from customers for future net energy costs and calculate 
an energy component of rates necessary to recover those costs. 
That rate is then reduced to offset the EBA balance in ratepay-
ers' favor over time. If the calculated energy component of the 
rate which would collect energy costs and "zero out" the balan-
cing account is different than the energy component currently 
included in rates, the Commission, by Order in a pass-through 
proceeding, will modify the energy component. The result is th ct 
over the long term Utah Power will collect only actual energy-
related expenses. 
In summary, the energy cost pass-through procedure 
removes from the utility company a very important risk - the 
undercollection of net energy related expenses. It also removes 
an opportunity for over-recovery of net energy costs. Eowever, 
the energy cost pass-through procedure does not insulate the 
Company from risks of reduced earnings related to misprojections 
of other components of the ratemaking process. 
The pass-through proceeding, which considers the 
elements of the energy component of rates, may or may not result 
in a change in the energy component of the rate since even wide 
fluctuations of the expense or revenue elements may be off set by 
changes in other elements. However, modifications of the 
elements which make up the energy component of the rate will 
ultimately have an impact on the energy component of the rate and 
on revenue collected from ratepayers. 
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A second exception to general rate case procedure 
exists. That exception was described by this Court in ll.t..ah 
De~artment of Business Regulation. Division of Public Utilities 
v. ~ 614 P.2d 1242 (1980) as an "offset" proceeding. An 
offset proceeding is intended to provide prompt rate adjustment 
for unusual changes in expenses other than energy costs. h~ile 
the Court intended to allow for abbreviated proceedings related 
to items of expense outside of energy-related costs, the offset 
proceeding shares the same limititation as the pass-through 
energy cost statute, namely that it allows from the pass-through 
cf a particular extraordinary expense, and is not a vehicle for 
the consideration of "just and reasonable" rates including a 
fair rate of return. No utility to date has filed an application 
for a rate increase based on the Court's delineation of a 
"offset" proceeding for extraordinary expenses other than energy 
costs. 
Plaintiff asserts that the Public Services Commission 
decision at issue allows Utah Power to further modify the 
existing risk relationship between the Company and ratepayers, 
using the energy cost pass-through procedure to shift to the 
ratepayers risk associated with misprojection of elements of 
rates other than the energy related expenses and revenues. This 
action is an unwarranted and unlawful misuse of the energy cost 
pass-through procedure and has the effect of a future increase in 
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rates to insure company earnings for past periods, resulting in 
the Public Service Commission essentially guaranteeing the 
company a minimum level of earnings. and thereby removing 
incentives to be cost effective and efficient in utility 
operation, in violation of existing regulatory policy and law. 
POINT I 
COMMISSION'S ORDER IN THIS PROCEEDING RESULTED 
IN A ONE-TIME INCREASE IN RATES 'l'O THE CUSTOMERS 
OF UTAH POWER OF $6,012,000 
Section 54-7-12(1) Utah Code Ann. (1981 Amend.) defines 
rate increase as "any direct increase in a rate, fare, toll, 
rental or other charge of a public utility or any modification 
of a classification. contract. practice. ruJe or a regulation 
that increases a rate. fare. toll. rental or other charge of a 
public utility" • (Emphasis added.) The language of this sec-
tion, which prefaces the procedures required in the consideration 
by the Commission of a rate increase, is obviously intended to ~ 
all-inclusive. Whether a rate increase occurs as the result of a 
direct modification of the Company's tariff on file with the 
Commission, or whether it results in a modification of any 
practice, rule, regulation, contract or classification which has 
the effect of increasing rates, the procedural requirements of 
the applicable portion of § 54-7-12 apply. 
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The result of the Commission's Order transferring 
$6,012,000 from the EBA to the Company for the purpose of 
increasing Company return in 1982 is that the Company has been 
granted a one-time rate increase of $6,012,000. 
Any adjustment to any element of the Energy Balancing 
Account or other components of the pass-through procedure 
inevitably results in a modification of rates and revenue 
collected by the Company. The fact that there is uncertainty as 
to when the rate increase will occur does not detract from the 
certainty of the rate increase, itself. 
Although the energy component of the rates charged to 
Utah ratepayers was not modified by the Commission's Order in 
this case, the rate increase nonetheless was granted. The energy 
component of the rate remains the same until the energy related 
expenses and revenues in total require a modification and that 
modification is adopted by the Commission. The sir.1ple effect of 
the Commission's Order in this proceeding is that by renoving 
from the current balance of the EBA $6,012,000, which would have 
been returned to ratepayers in the future, rates during the 
future will be higher in order to allow the Company to retain the 
$6,012,000. This fact was conceded by Utah Power Witness 
Bryner: 
Question: The results of the $6.000,000 
taken out of the balancing account, you 
testified previously, will result in the 
surcharge for energy costs being raised, is 
that correct? In order to collect in the 
future an additional $6,010,000? 
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Answer: Some time in the future that will 
occur. 
Question: Do you know when in the future? 
Answer: No, not until there has to be an 
increase. 
Question: But at some point 6,000,000 
additional dollars will have to be recovered 
from ratepayers because of that $6,000,000 
adjustment, is that correct? 
Answer: It--had it not been removed. yes. 
Commissioner Byrne: It may be a reduction 
foregone rather than an increase required. 
no? 
The Witness: That's correct. 
Question: (By Mr. Rich) It is an additional 
$6,000,000 that must be recovered somehow 
whether in less of a reduction or increase? 
Answer: A dollar is a dollar. 
(Record 220-221.) 
The $6,Ul2,000 increase granted by the Public Service 
Commission is currently being collected from Utah ratepayers. In 
Case No. 8J-u35-u4, by Order issued July 1, 1983 (after the Order 
issued in this case but prior to the Order on Rehearing issued 
July 5, 1983), the PSC reduced the energy component of Utah Power 
rates. This reduction was based on evidence presented that due 
to large amounts of cheap hydropower available in the Northwest, 
revenue expections from non-tariff rates and a reduction in cost 
of coal from company owned mines. that by October 1, 1983 the EBA 
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would have a balance in ratepayers' favor of $10,371,000. The 
Commission reduced the energy component of the rate by an amount 
which was intended to reduce the EBA balance to zero by Octo-
ber 31, 1983. If the Company request at issue in this proceeding 
had not been granted, the balance in the EBA in favor of 
ratepayers would have been $6,012,000 higher and the reduction in 
rates ordered by the Public Service Commission in order to 
meet the goal of "zeroing out" the EBA by October 31, 1983 would 
have been larger. The Public Service Comrr.ission Order in that 
proceeding is attached hereto as Appendix 4. 
The defendant cannot claim that this Order does not 
constitute a rate increase. There is only one source for utility 
revenues; that is utility ratepayers. There is only one way of 
increasing revenues collected from ratepayers and that is through 
an increase in rates. The fact that this increase is indirect 
and the result of a complicated balancing account procedure makes 
it no less a rate increase wherein the appropriate statutory 
requirements apply. 
POINT I I 
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION IS WITHOUT AUTHORITY 
TO GRANT A UTILITY A RATE INCREASE WHICH INCREASES 
COMPANY RETURN THROUGH THE USE 
OF THE ENERGY COST PASS-THROUGH PROCEDURE 
As discussed previously, the Energy Balancing Account 
is the vehicle used by the Commission to pass through to rate-
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payers net energy costs of Utah Power pursuant to the authority 
delegated to the Commission in § 54-7-12 (3) (d). Utah Code Ann. 
(1981 Amend.). The Commission's Order in this case (character-
izea by both Utah Power ~~j the Commission as an energy cost 
pass-through) provides to Utah Power the opportunity, outside m 
the consideration of the justness and reasonableness of its 
rates, to be granted a rate increase which increases its earn-
ings. This is entirely inconsistent with the language and intEr .. 
of § 54-7-12 (3) (d), Utah Code Ann. (1981 Amend.). As discussed 
previously, the Legislature. in originally fashioning the 
opportunity for pass-through treatment for energy costs, was 
concerned about misuse by utilities of such pass-throughs with 
the effect of increasing Company earnings or reducing the ince~ 
tive to provide cost-effective service. The Legislature designE: 
limic:,c;_cns fas discussed at pages 13, 14, ~ ) • as a means 
of ~reventing or minimizing these concerns. 
The Legislature's concerns in 19 /5 appear to be well-
founded. This Court has already had occasion to strike down an 
attempt by Mountain Fuel Supply Company to expand the pass-
through provision to include pass-through of non-energy related 
expenses, i.e., wage increases. The Department of Business 
Regulation. Division of Public Utilit~ v . .I:.._S._L_ , 614 p,2d 
1242 (Ut. 1980). Utah Power and Light's attempt to broaden the 
pass-through statue~ is much more far-reaching. 
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Utah Power has not attempted to pass through non-energy 
2xr~n5Ps to ratepayers. The Company's request is not a "pass-
t"couqh" at all. The Company seeks no less than to increase 
tuture rates to make up for past "under-collections". The only 
tuol available to that purpose is the energy cost pass-through 
statute. since in a general rate proceeding (such as Case No. 
82-0~J0-13 where. based on test year ending September 1983, the 
Public Service Commission granted Utah Power a rate increase on 
an interim basis of $49,000,000 November 8, 1982) the Public 
Service Commission must ignore past occurrences. The Company, 
therefore, attempted to re-shape the energy cost pass-through 
procedure to accomplish this end. 
The unambiguous language of § 54-7-12 (3) (d). Utah Code 
Ann. (1981 Amend.), cited ~lll..a, together with the intent of 
the Legisltuare as described in the House of Representatives' 
floor debate and the determination of the Court in D..epartment of 
B.11~~~ulation v. I:!Jblic Service Co~i.M , compel the 
~onclusion that the decision of the Public Service Commission in 
lhis proceeding is an unlawful misuse of the pass-through 
statute. 
THE COMMISSION ACTION IN THIS PROCEEDING 
'v IOLATES THE RULE AGAINST RETROACTIVE RATEMAKING 
The State of Utah has adopted by statute the rule 
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prohibiting retroactive ratemaking. Section 54-4-4(1) Utah CodE 
Ann. ( 1981 Supp.) states in part: 
• the Commission shall 
determine the just, reasonable or sufficient 
rates. fares. tolls. rentals. charges, 
classifications, rules, regulations, 
practices or contracts .t.lL ... bL.t~tiil. 
observed and in force and shall fix the same 
by order as hereinafter provided. (Emphasis 
added.)! 
This rule against retroactive ratemaking is based on one of the 
primary purposes of public utility regulation. i.e., encouraging, 
in the absence of competition, efficient and cost-effective 
operations resulting in reasonable utility rates. As stated by 
the Supreme Court of Rhode Island in .llil~~ Electric 
.C..Onw.filll'. v. ~ , 415 A.2d 177 (1980): 
The rule against retroactive rate-
making serves two basic functions. Initial-
ly, it protects the public by assuring that 
present customers will not be required to pay 
for past deficits for the company in their 
future payments. The Supreme Court of New 
Jersey has expressed this legitimate concern 
as follows: 
The present practice as set forth 
in these cases is fair to the public utility 
for it can act as speedily as it sees fit to 
move in the direction of inadequate rates and 
it is fair to the consumer in safeguarding 
him from surprise surcharges dating back over 
years that he had a right to assume were 
finished business for him and possibly over 
years when he was not even a consumer. N.e~ 
J~rsey Power and Light...J:..QmpQ.lU' v • .s...taU; 
Department of Public Utilities. Board..Qf. 
Public Commissione.I..S. , 15 N.J. 82, 93, 104, 
A. 2d 1,7 (1954). See lie~ Oklahoma Gas 
AD~l Company v. ~ , 113 Ok. 126, 
239 P.588 (1925). 
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The rule also prevents the company 
from employing future rates as a means of 
assuring the investments of its stockholders. 
G_.eorgia Railway anQJ.Q~Q.lllil.fillY v. Rail:: 
r~lDJllli.si.QJ:LQ~r;si.ll , 278 F.242 
(D.C. Geo. 1922). If the utility's income 
were guaranteed. the company would lose all 
incentive to operate in an efficient cost-
effective manner, thereby leading to higher 
operating costs and eventual rate increases. 
415. A.2d at 178, 179. 
The general policy reasons for the rule against retro-
active ratemaking were further elaborated by Justice Clark in his 
dissent from .S..O~n California Edison Comparuc v. ~ 
Utilities Commiss:l.Qn , 576 P. 2d 945 (Cal. 1978): 
The rule against retroactive 
ratemaking places upon the utility the risk 
that in fixing the rate the commission erred 
in estimating expenses and revenues. If the 
estimated revenues were too high or the 
estimated costs too low, the utility will 
bear the loss and fail to recover the pro-
jected rate of return. On the other hand. 
if estimated revenues are lower than those 
that actually occurred or the estimated costs 
higher than actual costs, the utility will 
benefit. Because so many circumstances exist 
significantly effecting the expense and 
revenue, it is to be anticipated that esti-
mated costs and revenues were rarely if ever 
equal actual ones and the utility will re-
alize more or less than the predicted rate 
of return. 
Tne rule against retroactive rate-
making serves to encourage efficiency because 
the utility will strive to hold down costs so 
as to increase profits under the established 
rate. Permitting retroactive ratemaking 
would shift the risk of error in estimating 
costs and revenues from the utility to the 
consumer reducing the utility's incentive for 
efficiency. 
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576 P.2d at 958. 
The Courts have routinely enforced the rule against 
retroactive ratemaking for tre protection of utilities [see for 
example, Arizona ~~QlllllfillY v. At~n_,_jj)peka and Santi 
Fe Railway CQlllllfilly , 284 U.S. 370 (U.S. S.Ct. 1931)]. as well as 
for utility ratepayers. 
However. the rule against retroactive ratemaking has 
typically not been applied to fuel adjustment clauses. As dis-
cussed previously, the purpose of fuel adjustment clauses is to 
remove energy related costs from the typical ratemaking proceed-
ing and fashion a more responsive and more accurate method of 
allowing the utility to recover such expenses. Often, such 
methods result in over or under-collection of energy related 
costs. 
Courts have been unwilling to utilize the rule against 
retroactive ratemaking to allow utilities to be enriched when a 
fuel adjustment clause resulted in over-collections of energy 
related costs. For example, in Public Service Co~~f 
Maryland v. D..elmarva Power and Light Company of_ll~rul , 400 
A.2d 1147 (Special Court of Appeals 1979). the Company's fuel 
rate adjustment clause had allowed the Company to collect in 
rates more than the cost of fuel. The Commission ordered a 
refund and the Company objected claiming, in part, that a refund 
would constitute retroactive ratemaking. The Court stated: 
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All the parties to this case agree 
that retroactive ratemaking is impermissible 
but we think the controversy in this case is 
to be distinguished from the Commission's 
function in approving rates to be charged in 
a base rate hearing proceeding. 
As we have indicated. the theory of 
permitting the filing of FRA [fuel rate 
adjustment] clauses with the Public Service 
Commission is to permit a more rapid recogni-
tion and recovery of fluctuating fuel costs 
without the requirement of lengthy and 
complex hearings. As these FRA clauses 
contemplate complex formulas which must be 
tested against mathematical calculations from 
designated figures each month, we conclude 
that implicitly, the Commission must retain 
jurisdiction over such charges in order to 
assure that the charges made are fair and 
reasonable to the customer as well as to the 
company •••• If as determined by the Com-
mission Delmarva did miscalculate its fuel 
rate and as a result of the miscalculation 
dia receive $400.000 in excess charges, then 
to suggest that the Commission had no power 
to order a refund as to these particular 
charges would make Section 27 (a) (2) [which 
prohibits collection of compensation 
different from specified in tariffs on file 
with the Commission] completely unenforceable 
and nugatory. We do not mean by this 
conclusion to suggest even remotely that the 
Commission is empowered to engage in 
retroactive ratemaking but we distinguish 
between the ordinary ratemaking process and 
the necessarily ongoing process of verifying 
and adjusting fuel rate adjustment clauses so 
that they accurately reflect the increased 
and decreased costs (we hope) of the fuel 
necessary to operate a utility plant. 
40U A.2d at 1153. 
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This exception from the rule against retroactive 
ratemaking for energy adjustment claus~s is necessary in order t 
prevent a utility from misusing the energy adjustment clause. 
Like Utah Power in this case, some utilities have attempted to 
use energy adjustment clauses as a means of attempting to 
guarantee that they actually earn their authorized rate of 
return. In Southern California Edison Company v. .£.u~ 
U~ilities Commission of Caljforni.a. , 576 P.2d 945 (Cal. 1978), 
the California Commission instituted an automatic fuel adjustment 
clause in 19/2 which allowed Edison to prepare a forecast of the 
quantity of fossil fuel it would need to purchase during a 12-
month future period and calculate the cost of such fuel at 
current prices and adjust its rates based on these predictions. 
However- by the end of 1974, Edison bad collected 408 Million 
Dollars for fuel expenses but had actually spent only $262.2 
Million Dollars, leaving the Company holding 145.8 Million 
Do1lars more than it needed to offset increased fuel costs. 
While Eaison described the adjustment as a "miniature rate 
proceeding intended to generate whatever higher rates were deemed 
necessary to prevent 'decay· in the utility's overall rate of 
return on invested capital", 576 P.2d 948, the Commission 
disagreed and 1) instituted a monthly balancing account in order 
to balance future over or under-collections in fuel costs and. 21 
ordered a refund of the 145 Million Dollar over-collection in 
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rates to customers over a three-year period. On appeal, the 
utility argued that the refund Order constituted retroactive 
ratemaking. 
The California Supreme Court made a distinction between 
typical ratemaking proceedings and "narrowly restricted and 
semi-automatic functioning ot an adjustment clause" which it 
Ieferred to as "substantially ministerial". 576 P.2d 953. The 
Court concluded that because the operation of the adjustment 
clause was not "ratemaking". the rule against retroactive rate-
making did not apply. 
In the case before this Court, Utah Power, like 
Southern California Edison, has attempted to use the energy 
balancing account pass-through procedure as a method of 
preventing "decay" in its overall rate of return. The Company 
presented testimony indicating that there was an foreseen drop in 
revenues during the year ending September, 1982 causing an 
overall earned rate of return less than authorized by the Public 
Service Commission. The Commission's decision, issued just prior 
to the end of 1982, allowed the Company a Six Million Dollar 
earning boost that increased the Company's total company return 
on equity for calendar year 1982 by almost one half of one per 
'cnt (Record 249). As previously discussed. approximately Six 
Million Dollars more revenue will be collected from Utah 
Jurisdictional ratepayers in the future by operation of the EBA 
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procedure as a result of the Commission's decrease in this 
proceeding. 
The Commission's decision in this proceeding in essenCE 
allows the exception to the rule against retroactive ratemaking 
for pass-through of energy costs to be expanded to such an exten• 
that it "eats up" the general rule. Permitting utilities to use 
the energy ba1ancing account pass-through mechanism as a means~ 
improving past earnings by increasing future rates is in contra-
vention of the policy reasons behind the rule against retroactive 
ratemaking The risk that actual conditions will vary from 
predictions in the rate case would no longer (as has always been 
the case in the past) borne by the Company but now would be borne 
by utility ratepayers with the effect of guaranteeing a level of 
return for Utah Power and reducing the traditional regulation 
imosed incentive to provide cost effective and efficient 
operations. 
POINT I~ 
COMMISSION'S ORDER IS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS 
BECAUSE THERE ARE NO FINDINGS OR CONCLUSIONS 
THAT THE INCREASE IN RATES IS JUST AND REASONABLE, 
AND THERE IS NO COMPETENT OR SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 
TO SUPPORT SUCH A FINDING. 
The Court states in llt~2artment of Business 
I\eCJJJ.l.Ati.Qn v. ,f,ublic Service Co~i.Qn , 614 P.2d at 1245 
that: 
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The first prerequisite of a rate order 
is that it be preceded by a hearing and 
findings. At such a hearing, the Legislature 
intended that there be evidence introduced 
that could reasonably be calculated to 
resolve the issue presented for 
determination, which is this case is a rate 
increase. The findings required by statute 
(of a just and reasonable rate §54-7-12(2)) 
must be made in accordance with the evidence 
so presented. If there be no substantial 
evidence to support an essential finding, 
that finding cannot stand. and a rate order 
predicated upon it must fall. 
Because, as discussed previous herein, Utah Power's 
request in this proceeding was neither for an "offset" of 
unusual expenses or a pass-through of energy costs, the 
applicable standards of evidence and required findings related 
to such proceedings are not applicable. Therefore. the finding 
of a "just and reasonable rate" (of §54-7-12(2) Utah Code Ann. 
(1981 Amendment)) must be made and must be in accordance with 
the evidence presented. In this proceeding, the Commission's 
Order did not find that the rate increase granted was just and 
reasonable. Nor was there evidence upon which such a finding 
could have been based. Therefore. the Commission's Order must 
In the Commission's December 30th order, it concluded 
only that "the proposed adjustment of the company is just and 
reasonable and should be allowed". (Appendix 1, Order p. 4.) 
There was no finding or conclusion that the rates resulting 
from the Commission's Order were just and reasonable, nor could 
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there be. Utah Power and the Commission both considered this 
proceeding as if it were an energy-cost pass through proceedir., 
and dia not present or consider evidence necessary in the 
determination of just and reasonable rates. The evidence 
necessary for such a finding, described previously herein and 
discussed in Utah De~artment o~~ Regulation v • 
.£]Jblic Service Comm~iQn , requires the choosing of a future 
"test year", a projection of revenues, expenses, and "rate 
base" for that test year, and a determination of the 
appropriate return on investment during that period. 
The evidence presented by Utah Power in support of 
its request did not meet this standard of evidence. No evi-
dence was presented by Utah Power with regard to jurisdictiona: 
expenses or investment for any period of time. The company die 
present evidence that revenues for the twelve months ending 
August, 1982, were lower than projected by the company and 
included by the Commission in rates in Case no. 81-035-13. 
Record 7-8. No evidence was presented with regard to Utah 
jurisdictional revenues for any future period. Evidence 
relating to company actual return on equity was presented with 
regard to the twelve months ending August of 1982 for both 
total company and Utah jurisdiction. No evidence was presentec 
by the company with regard to earnings current at the time of 
the hearing, or of projections of return for any future period 
or as to the appropriate level of return which would currently 
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be required. The only evidence relating to the current finan-
cial condition of the company was presented by Division witness 
Compton, who testified that the financial condition of the 
company and investor expectations as reflected by the stock 
price did not require an additional $6,012,000 in return. 
Record at 104, 105. This testimony, although uncontroverted, 
was ignored by the Commission. 
In the Commission's Order, there were no findings as 
to rate base or expenses for any period. There was a finding 
that for the twelve months ending August, 1982, revenues were 
less than projected in Case No. 81-035-13. (Appendix 1, Order 
page 2). 
The Commission also found that Utah jurisdictional 
return on equity for the twelve months ending August, 1982, was 
13.25%, and that the company was allowed a return on equity of 
16.3% in case No. 81-035-13. (Id., page 3) It was apparently 
in reliance on this fact that the company during 1982 had not 
earned a return on equity equal to that authorized in Case No. 
81-u35-13 that the Commission concluded the retro-active 
"adjustment" proposed by the company was was "just and 
reasonable". Such reliance on a prior determination of 
reasonable rate of return has been characterized by this Court 
as an "abuse of authority". In ll.t~ate Board of Re~-'h 
U~~Qlic Service Cornmi.s.si.Qn, 583 P.2d 609 (Utah. 1978), the 
issue was the appropriateness of using prior determinations in 
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Caiculating rate of return. The Court concluded that in the 
determination of just and reasonable rates. the Commission mus'. 
make a determination as to the financial conditions .t.h.e.n 
existing. The Court states: 
Such a course necessitates the taking of 
evidence after which the Commisison may well 
conclude that circumstances remain unchanged 
since the prior Order. However, to totally 
ignore the possibility of significant changes 
of circumstances or to assume there has been 
none, must be viewed as error. 583 P.2d at 
611. 
Because the Commission chose to rely on past 
determinations as to appropriate rate or return, and because 
there was not substantial evidence presented in which there 
could be a determination made as to the other basic rate maki~ 
components for the Utah jurisdiction of Utah Power & Light, 
namely Utah jurisdiction revenues, expenses and rate base, 
there was no "evidence introduced that could reasonably be 
caiculated to resolve the issue presented for determination, 
which is in this case a rate increase". Utah Department oi 
B~siness Resulation v. Public Service Co~~ , 614 P.2d 
at 1245. In other words, there was not substantial evidence in 
the record upon which a finding that the rate increase granted 
in this case is just and reasonable-
Moreover. the Commission's conclusion that the 
"adjustment" proposed by the company is just and reasonable 
does not constitute a finding that rates are just and 
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reasonable. Because ot the deficiencies of the evidence 
presented, reliance of prior determinations, and lack of a 
finding that the rate increase granted in the case was just and 
reasonable, the Commission's decision herein is arbitrary and 
capricious, and must be vacated by this Court • 
.cQNCLUS ION 
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Public 
Service Commission in the case before the Court must be set 
aside and vacated, with directions to return $6,012,000 to the 
ba1ance, in favor of ratepayers. of the EBA, thereby allowing 
that amount to return to the ratepayers. 
The decision represents an attempt to re-shape 
regulatory law and policy, altering the role of regulation and 
the relationships between utilities and ratepayers. Such 
matters are the province, not of the Public Service Commission. 
but of the Legislature. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 11th day of October, 
1983. 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Department of 
Business Regulation 
Division of Public Utilities 
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